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Richard Cantor and Frank Packer
Sovereign ratings are gaining importance as more governments with greater default 
risk borrow in international bond markets. But while the ratings have proved useful to 
governments seeking market access, the difficulty of assessing sovereign risk has led 
to agency disagreements and public controversy over specific rating assignments.
Recognizing this difficulty, the financial markets have shown some skepticism toward
sovereign ratings when pricing issues.
In recent years, the demand for sovereign credit rat-
ings—the risk assessments assigned by the credit rating
agencies to the obligations of central governments—
has increased dramatically. By reducing investor
uncertainty about risk exposures, sovereign ratings
have enabled many governments, some with prior his-
tories of debt defaults, to gain access to international
bond markets.  This edition of Current Issues begins
with some basic information about the uses and types
of sovereign ratings, the development of the sovereign
ratings business, and the history of sovereign defaults.
We then examine two features of sovereign ratings that
have often sparked controversy—agency disagree-
ments over specific sovereign ratings and the relation-
ship between sovereign ratings and market yields.
Our investigation reveals that on the whole, agency
disagreements over sovereign ratings are quite com-
mon.  In the case of below-investment-grade issues,
Moody's and Standard and Poor’s assign divergent rat-
ings much more frequently to sovereign bonds than to
corporate bonds.  We believe that the prevalence of dis-
agreements reflects both the relative inexperience of
the agencies in rating sovereign credits and the diffi-
culty of assessing the political and economic condi-
tions that affect a country’s creditworthiness.
Our analysis of the relationship between sovereign
ratings and market yields suggests that the financial
markets recognize the difficulties inherent in measur-
ing sovereign credit risk.  The markets generally
require much larger risk premia for sovereign debt
issues than for similarly rated corporate bonds.
Moreover, the rank-orderings of sovereign risks
implied by market yields frequently differ from the
rankings assigned by the agencies.  Thus, although sov-
ereign ratings have become a prerequisite for broad
international bond market acceptance, their influence
on specific market yields appears limited.
Uses and Types of Sovereign Ratings1
Like other credit ratings, sovereign ratings are assess-
ments of the relative likelihood a borrower will default
on its obligations.  Governments generally seek credit
ratings in order to ease their access to international
capital markets, where many investors, particularly
U.S. investors, prefer rated securities over unrated
securities of apparently similar credit risk.  In the past,
governments tended to seek ratings on their foreign
currency obligations exclusively, because foreign cur-
rency bonds were more likely to be placed with inter-
national investors than domestic currency offerings.
But in recent years, as international investors have
increased their demand for bonds issued in currencies
other than the traditional global currencies, more 
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sovereigns have been obtaining domestic currency
bond ratings as well.
The credit ratings on a sovereign’s foreign currency
bonds at present never exceed, and are often lower,
than the ratings on its domestic currency obligations.
The rating agencies and investors reason that because
governments have broad-ranging powers to tax domes-
tic income and print domestic currency,2 they may be
better able to fulfill their domestic currency obliga-
tions.3 Nonetheless, domestic currency bond defaults
do occasionally occur when the authorities choose to
avoid the political consequences of increased tax rates
or debasement of the currency.
Sovereign ratings are accorded considerable atten-
tion not only because some of the largest issuers on the
international capital markets are national governments,
but also because these assessments affect the ratings of
a large number of other borrowers of the same nation-
ality.  The agencies generally do not assign ratings to
public or private sector issuers that are higher than
their home country’s sovereign rating; therefore, sover-
eign ratings influence the ratings given local munici-
palities, provincial governments, and private compa-
nies headquartered within the same country.
The Development of the Sovereign Ratings Business
Although the rating agencies’ current practice of
assigning overall ratings for sovereign risk began only
a few decades ago, Moody’s has been rating bonds
issued by foreign governments since 1919. International
bond markets were very active in the early part of the
twentieth century:  by 1929, Moody’s was rating bonds
issued by roughly fifty central governments.  The
demand for sovereign ratings, however, abated with the
onset of the Great Depression, and after World War II,
the international bond markets came to a standstill.
In the 1970s, international bond markets revived,
but demand for sovereign ratings was slow to material-
ize.  As recently as ten years ago, only fifteen foreign
governments borrowed in U.S. capital markets and felt
the need to obtain credit agency ratings.  Because these
governments were almost all pristine credits, their sov-
ereign risk assessments were quite straightforward and
noncontroversial.  Other governments were able to
obtain credit through other means.  A few financially
strong governments gained access to international cap-
ital through the Euromarkets without ratings.  Less
creditworthy sovereigns generally obtained interna-
tional credit from banks, and a few issued privately
placed bonds without credit ratings.
The sovereign ratings business took off in the late
1980s and early 1990s when weaker credits found mar-
ket conditions sufficiently favorable to issue debt in
international credit markets (Table 1).  These govern-
ments increasingly tapped the Yankee bond market,
where credit ratings are a de facto requirement.
Consequently, the growth in demand for rating services
has coincided with a trend toward assignment of lower
quality sovereign credit ratings. Before 1985, most ini-
tial ratings were AAA/Aaa; in the 1990s, the median
rating assigned has been the lowest possible investment
grade rating, BBB-/Baa3.
With the increase in demand for ratings, agency sov-
ereign rating activity has returned to pre-Depression
levels.  Today Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s each
rate about fifty sovereigns.  In the last few years, three
additional rating agencies—Duff and Phelps, IBCA,
and Thomson BankWatch—have ventured into the sov-
ereign rating business as well.
Sovereign Defaults
Sovereign lending has historically been a risky busi-
ness.  A burst in sovereign lending in the 1920s—the
closest precedent for the recent spiral in sovereign
bond issuance—ended with a wave of defaults during
the Great Depression.  Twenty-one out of fifty-eight
nations defaulted on their international bonds between
1930 and 1935; another four had already defaulted by
1929 (Suter 1992).  On a volume basis, roughly 70 per-
cent of all sovereign debt (excluding Canadian debt)
issued in the United States between 1926 and 1929
defaulted before the end of 1937 (Mintz 1952).  By
comparison, only about 30 percent of U.S. corporate
debt issued between 1926 and 1929 defaulted before
1944 (Hickman 1958).  Moody’s was one of many par-
ties taken by surprise by the extent of the sovereign
default wave: a majority of the defaulting countries had
investment grade ratings from this agency in 1929
(Moody’s 1981). 
Because the business of rating sovereign credits has
only recently grown to a scale comparable to its prewar
highs, there is no significant track record of default for
Table 1
The Growth of the Sovereign Ratings Business
Year Rating Was
First Assigned by Number of Newly Median Rating Assigned






Sources: Standard and Poor’s; Moody’s Investors Service.rated issues since the 1930s.  Recent history suggests,
however, that sovereign lending remains risky.  A
Standard and Poor’s survey of seventy-two govern-
ments with outstanding domestic and foreign currency
debt found that thirty had defaulted at least once on
domestic or foreign currency debt since 1970 (Beers
1995).  Although these sovereigns had not been rated
by an internationally recognized rating agency before
their defaults,4 nine have subsequently been rated by
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s.
The frequency of default has varied with the type of
debt.  Table 2 breaks down sovereign defaults since
1970 into defaults on domestic currency bonds, foreign
currency bonds, and foreign currency bank loans.
Clearly, defaults on foreign currency obligations have
been more common (thirty-three) than defaults on
domestic currency obligations (nine).  Domestic cur-
rency defaults have usually been the result of an over-
throw of an old political order—as in Russia and
Vietnam—or the byproduct of dramatic economic
adjustment programs aimed at curbing hyperinfla-
tion—as in Argentina and Brazil.  Twenty-nine of the
thirty-three defaults on foreign currency were through
3
a rescheduling of bank debt.  Standard and Poor’s has
treated these reschedulings as defaults because the
reschedulings ultimately imposed losses on creditors.
Of the four sovereigns that defaulted on foreign cur-
rency bonds, only one—Zimbabwe—did so on a bond
that was publicly traded and internationally held.
Differences in Sovereign Ratings
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s frequently disagree
on specific sovereign ratings assignments.  In the wake
of Mexico’s recent financial crisis, the financial press
noted that Standard and Poor’s had been considerably
more optimistic than Moody’s in 1994, giving Mexico
a BB+ rating with a positive outlook for upgrade, while
Moody’s rated Mexico’s obligations Ba (Branston
1995).  Standard and Poor’s has subsequently down-
graded Mexico, eliminating the difference in ratings.
The original disagreement, however, was notable,
although not particularly large compared with other
ratings differences between the agencies.
In fact, “split ratings” at the whole letter grade occur
quite frequently, leaving investors uncertain about the
credit risks of the governments in question.  For exam-
ple, Standard and Poor’s gives South Africa and Poland
below-investment-grade ratings of BB, while Moody’s
assigns both countries investment-grade ratings at
Baa3.  In other cases of divided ratings, Moody’s has
been more severe than Standard and Poor’s: current
ratings for Colombia (BBB-/Ba1) and Argentina 
(BB-/B1) have Moody’s on the low side of ratings
splits.   Although split ratings for sovereigns when both
are above the investment-grade cutoff are less com-
mon, the case of China, rated BBB by Standard and
Poor’s and A3 by Moody’s, stands out.   Standard and
Poor’s is evidently more troubled than Moody’s by the
credit risks stemming from the lack of transparency in
China’s markets and the diffuseness of the power struc-
ture (South China Morning Post 1994).   
Measuring the Frequency of Agreement. We can
obtain a more precise idea of the prevalence of ratings
differences by comparing the frequency of agreement
between Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s in their rat-
ings of sovereign credits, on the one hand, and corpo-
rate credits, on the other.  In Table 3, we quantify the
differences across foreign currency ratings assigned to
48 countries as of June 9, 1995, and across the ratings
of 1,168 U.S. corporations as of year-end 1993.
Sovereigns tend to be more highly rated than corporate
credits on average.  About 44 percent are rated
AAA/Aaa or AA/Aa by Standard and Poor’s and
Moody’s, compared with only 12 percent for U.S. cor-
porations; only 29 percent of sovereigns are below
investment grade, compared with 40 percent of all U.S.
corporations.  
Table 2
Sovereign Debt Defaults since 1970
Year of Default
Local Foreign Currency Foreign Currency
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Ratings differences between Moody’s and Standard
and Poor’s are roughly similar overall for sovereigns
and corporates, but striking differences appear within
broad rating categories.  Sovereign ratings of the two
agencies are often identical in the high-investment-
grade area, reflecting in part the relatively large portion
of the sovereign sample consisting of AAA/Aaa cred-
its, such as the United Kingdom, the United States,
France, Japan, and Germany.  The two agencies agree
67 percent of the time on sovereigns rated AA/Aa and
AAA/Aaa, whereas they only agree 53 percent of the
time on corporate credits in this broad category.  In the
below-investment-grade area, however, the agencies
assign identical ratings 41 percent of the time for cor-
porates but only 29 percent of the time for sovereigns.
Thus, differences of opinion between the agencies for
low-quality credits appear greater for sovereigns than
for corporates.
Why Sovereign Ratings Differ across Agencies. It is
probably fair to conclude that the greater frequency of
disagreements over below-investment-grade sovereign
ratings is evidence of greater uncertainty in the mea-
surement of this type of risk.  Such uncertainty is, how-
ever, understandable.  As we have seen, the modern
sovereign ratings business is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon, and the agencies’ lack of experience in this
area likely contributes to divergent assessments.
Moveover, measuring sovereign credit risk is a difficult
task, in many ways more difficult than measuring the
credit risk of U.S. corporations.  In analyzing the credit
risk of governments, the agencies must consider factors
that not only affect solvency, but also those that may
independently affect the willingness to pay,5 such as
the stability of political institutions, social and eco-
nomic cohesion, and integration into the world eco-
nomic system.  It is not surprising, then, that opinions
about the measurement and weighing of such qualita-
tive country risk factors can differ greatly among the
rating agencies.
Market Yields and Sovereign Ratings
To what extent are the greater difficulties of measuring
sovereign risk reflected in the relationship between
sovereign ratings and market yields?   We do find a
positive relationship between the yields on sovereign
bonds and the yields on similarly rated U.S. corporate
securities, but the correlation is an inexact one.  The
chart below presents yields on the outstanding U.S.
dollar bonds of nineteen sovereigns and yields on
indicative U.S. corporate bonds, and maps each of
these yields against the contemporaneous credit ratings
assigned by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s.6 The
top panel presents these data for December 16, 1994
(just before the Mexican financial crisis), and the bot-
tom panel for March 10, 1995 (during its aftermath).
Although the ordering of market yields of investment-
Table 3
Comparing Sovereign Foreign Currency Ratings and
U.S. Corporate Bond Ratings
Rated Same by Moody’s 
Share of Total and Standard and Poor’s
Broad Rating Sovereigns  Corporates Sovereigns Corporates
Categories (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
AA/Aa
or above 44 12 67 53
Other
investment grade 27 48 56 36
Below
investment grade 29 40 29 41
Sources: Standard and Poor’s; Moody’s Investors Service.
Note: The sample consists of 48 sovereigns rated jointly by Moody’s
and Standard and Poor’s as of June 9, 1995, and 1,168 corporations
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grade sovereign debt is highly correlated with credit
ratings for both periods, the correlation is lower for our
sample of non-investment-grade sovereigns, where
numerous disagreements between markets and the agen-
cies are clearly visible.7
Both panels of the chart indicate that sovereign
bonds typically trade at higher yields than comparably
rated U.S. corporate bonds.  Mean and median sover-
eign spreads over comparable corporates for our sam-
ple are 147 and 50 basis points, respectively.  Indeed,
thirty-six of the thirty-eight sovereign observations are
priced at higher yields than comparable corporate aver-
ages.  Another regularity is that the gap between sover-
eign and corporate yields increases as ratings quality
declines.  (The mean of the spreads over corporates
increases from 29 to 310 basis points, and the median
from 11 to 172 basis points, when one moves from an
investment-grade subsample of sovereigns to a non-
investment-grade subsample.)
The two panels of the chart highlight the dramatic
movement in yields since the Mexican crisis and show
that sovereign spreads over comparable corporates are
not only consistently positive, but also highly volatile.
Between the two dates, the gap between the market
yields on sovereign credits and similarly rated corpo-
rate credits widened for fifteen of the nineteen bonds,
including all eight of the below-investment-grade
obligations.  The mean and median spread over corpo-
rates rose 169 and 52 basis points, respectively.  Again,
the non-investment-grade credits exhibited the most
striking behavior, the mean and median spreads rising
397 and 257 basis points, respectively.
Of course, it is not unusual for similarly rated
classes of bonds to trade at different yields.8 Such dif-
ferences may be explained by a variety of factors.  In
this case, U.S. investors may simply have required a
premium to invest in cross-border securities, or expected
recoveries on defaulted sovereign debts may have been
much lower than on defaulted U.S. corporates.9
Most likely, however, these differences in yields
arose simply because financial markets are more pes-
simistic, on average, about sovereign credit risks than
are the rating agencies.  Such differences of opinion
between the market and the rating agencies over
absolute credit risk appear most extreme for below-
investment-grade credits, the same area in which dis-
agreements between the agencies over relative credit
risks have already been shown to be most common.
Conclusion
Our overview of sovereign ratings gives particular
emphasis to two issues—the differences among the
agencies in the assessment of sovereign risk and the
influence of sovereign ratings on the markets.  When
comparing Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings,
we have found substantially more disagreement
between the agencies in their assessments of credit risk
for low-quality sovereigns than for low-quality U.S.
corporate credits.  We suggest that such disagreements
owe much to the subjectivity of many aspects of sover-
eign risk measurement and the relative youth of the
modern sovereign rating business.
Our examination of market yields on selected sov-
ereign debt issues indicates that the investor commu-
nity not only frequently disagrees with the agencies
over the rank-ordering of credit risks, but also shows
considerably more pessimism in its absolute assess-
ment of the level of credit risk in the sovereign sector.
Thus, although sovereign ratings help issuers gain
access to the international bond markets, the market
appears to regard sovereign ratings with some skepti-
cism when pricing issues. 
Notes
1.  For a broad discussion of the history and economics of the credit
rating industry, see Cantor and Packer (1994).
2. Although some might consider pure money financing of domes-
tic currency debts and the subsequent decline in the purchasing
power of debt service payments a type of default, the rating agen-
cies categorize this threat as market risk rather than credit risk.
3.  The rating agencies differ in the relative distinctions they make
between domestic and foreign currency credit risks.  In particular,
Moody’s has generally been more reluctant than Standard and
Poor’s to assign domestic currency ratings more than one or two
notches higher than foreign currency ratings (Purcell et al. 1993).
In fact, before World War II, Moody’s often assigned higher sover-
eign ratings for foreign currency bonds than for domestic currency
obligations, probably in the belief that international political con-
siderations would create greater pressures to repay foreign cur-
rency bonds, which were largely held by cross-border investors.
4.  The one exception is Venezuela, which defaulted on foreign cur-
rency bank debt in 1982 while maintaining a AA rating from
Standard and Poor’s on bonds on which it did not default.
5.  An important distinction between sovereign and corporate debt
is that creditors are less able to claim significant assets in the event
of a sovereign default.  For theoretical discussions, see Eaton,
Gersovitz, and Stiglitz (1986) and Bulow and Rogoff (1989).  For
empirical work on the importance of factors representing willing-
ness to pay, see Lee (1993).
6.  When different, the Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings
are averaged.  The corporate bond yields are indicative quotes on
five-year industrial bonds taken from Bloomberg.  The yields on
the sovereign bonds have all been adjusted to five-year maturities
by adding their risk spreads over Treasuries of comparable matu-
rity to the prevailing five-year Treasury bond yield.7.  Correlations between ratings and yield orderings as measured by
the Pearson-product moment correlation coefficients were 0.92 and
0.84, respectively, for the investment-grade sample in 1994 and
1995, and 0.42 and 0.56 for the non-investment-grade sample in the
same years.
8.  For example, looking at Moody’s ratings in 1977-92 and related
credit spreads, Longstaff and Schwartz (1994) found that the mean
credit spreads over Treasuries were 45, 47, 43, and 24 basis points
higher for utilities than for industrials at the Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa
ratings levels, respectively.
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9.  Standard and Poor’s states explicitly that it does not consider
expected recovery values in its rating policies.  In contrast,
Moody’s shows some willingness to take recovery values into
account.  Note that differences in liquidity are unlikely to explain
the average yield differences observed in the chart because the spe-
cific sovereign issues studied there are quite large and relatively
liquid.
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